Among the problems of analysis of the transition economy, one of the central places is occupied by the problems of transformation of methods of corporate management of property relations. In fact, it was redistribution and a clear consolidation of property rights and enterprise management methods that were once proclaimed one of the main goals of economic reforms in the countries of the former USSR. In pursuit of this goal, national governments have implemented and are implementing large-scale privatization programs, corporate legislation is being developed, and new organizational and administrative methods for managing the enterprise are being generated. The course of reforms has attracted the attention of researchers. In a number of works on economic issues, the problems of the evolution of corporate governance are analyzed, the effectiveness of enterprise management is assessed from the point of view of modern approaches to research in the conditions of market transformations.
The question that economists very often ask at present is why, despite the large mass privatization program designed to actually create a property rights market, despite serious efforts to launch redistribution processes, the distribution of formal and, in particular, informal property rights The methods of enterprise management in post-Soviet companies are still far from the ideal that the authors of the reforms sought. Why does the internalization of control continue to exist in these corporations, a situation in which the firm’s management is independent of any external influence, even if formally a significant part of the assets is owned by external owners?
The most common approach to analyzing the situation around corporate governance is largely microeconomic. That is, in fact, the situation is analyzed from the perspective of a single corporation, factors that allow the management of the company to ignore the interests of external investors, apply methods convenient for them to manage the enterprise and successfully pursue their own interests are considered. At the same time, special attention is paid to the inefficiency of the legislation and the judicial system. It is impossible to deny the importance of legal factors: as studies show, the distribution of control in corporations really depends on the quality of corporate legislation and the effectiveness of mechanisms for its implementation. However, it seems that the consideration of these factors as given limits our knowledge of the subject and makes them fragmentary. Legislation and public policy are the product of the struggle of various interest groups. This also applies to legislation governing the relationship between the real and financial sectors.
Therefore, the root causes that determine the course of evolution of corporate governance, enterprise management methods , should be sought in the structural features of the corresponding economic system. An analysis of the methods, technologies and procedures of corporate governance in the economy can and should be supplemented by addressing specific economic factors in the formation of one or another management system or one or another distribution of control. This thesis is intended to realize two main goals: the first is to formulate a theoretical problem related to the concept of corporate governance, and the second is to motivate an economic approach to the analysis of the evolution of corporate governance and property relations.