The British historian Liddell Garth is a well-known and multifaceted person. From an ordinary officer, he “evolved” into a prominent military theorist, and later became one of the best British historians of the 20th century. Liddell had a great influence on the theory of strategy and the conduct of mechanized warfare. Several books by Liddell on military theory were recognized as the best during the life of the author. One of them is the “Indirect Action Strategy”, which will be discussed in this article.
about the author
Liddell Garth was born on October 31, 1895 in Paris, in the family of a priest. Educated at St. Paul's School in London, and then continued his studies in Cambridge. In World War I, he served in the British Army, where he was an officer in a rifle company. Gart's experience at the forefront was limited in the fall, and in the winter of 1915, after being wounded, he went home.
He returned to the front in 1916 to take part in the battle for the Somme. Garth was injured in a gas attack and was sent to the hospital on July 19, 1916. The battalion in which Liddel served was completely destroyed on the first day of the offensive - July 1. Losses of 60,000 people in one day became the most significant in British history.
The experience gained on the Western Front influenced Basil Liddell Garth's whole life. The Indirect Action Strategy (the book with which the author’s name is usually associated) is the best proof of this.
Garth continued his service in the volunteer units of Stroud and Cambridge, where he was preparing replenishment for the army. During this time, he wrote several booklets on infantry training, which reached General Maxse. After the war, he was transferred to the Royal Army Training Corps and prepared the final version of the "Guide for the Infantry."
Due to his state of health, Liddel could not serve in the army, so he continued his career as a theorist and writer. In 1924 he worked as a war correspondent at the Morning Post, from 1925 to 1935 he served as military commissar at the Daily Telegraph, then until 1939 he worked at The Times. Liddell wrote a series of stories about military leaders, where he put forward his ideas on military strategy.
Liddell concept
Having experienced a meaningless way of conducting battles, Garth as early as the twenties thought about the causes of enormous human losses and analyzed the principles, which, in his opinion, were ignored by all military leaders. These principles formed the basis of his theory, which he outlined in detail on the pages of the "Strategy for Indirect Action". Basil Liddell Garth condemned persistent “head-on” attacks, wasting human resources in futile attempts.
Gradually, thoughts formed into a concept published in the work "Decisive Wars in History" in 1929. The author proposed the most complete formulation of principles in his “Strategy”, which was published in 1941. The book gained great fame both in the military and in academic circles.
The release in 1967 of the fourth edition of The Strategy was seen as a major event in the Armed Forces of the West. Although Liddela was considered a bourgeois historian, and far from pro-Soviet, his books were published in the Soviet Union. The depth of analysis and truly encyclopedic coverage made this work of Garth indispensable for lovers of military history.
From Sparta to WWII
In the Strategy for Indirect Action, the writer successively examines wars and battles from ancient times to World War II. Using real examples, he proves that indirect actions bring more effect and lower costs than trying to defeat the enemy in a frontal attack. Garth disassembles bloody battles, the mistakes of generals and military disasters and associates them with a violation of the basic principles of the strategy.
In the first part, the author analyzes the Greek wars, examining the military experience of Epaminondas, who made a considerable contribution to the development of military art. Here he talks about Philip II, who created a strong army, the leadership of which was adopted by his son Alexander of Macedon. The Roman generals and their martial art were also analyzed by a military historian.
In his book Indirect Action Strategy, the author also encloses numerous battle maps. Byzantine and medieval wars, commanders Cromwell and Thurenne - in short, all who contributed to the development of military art attracted the attention of Liddell.
The author gives a special place to the French Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte’s army, analyzing and analyzing battles, troop movements and political maneuvers. In a separate chapter, he sums up and concludes that over twenty-five centuries the priorities of the art of warfare have gradually shifted to the "science of extermination of people."
The beginning of the XX century
In the second part, Garth shares his views on the war, sets out the theory of strategy and conclusions drawn from the analysis of military experience. Liddell devoted this part to the analysis of the First World War - starting from 1914 and until 1918, he examined in detail all the areas in which the war was fought, analyzing the mistakes and plans of the generals. “Strategy has become a servant of tactics” - this is how the author describes the actions of the military leaders of the First World War. And summarizes: "Victory or defeat mainly depends on the moral condition of the enemy and indirectly on blows to him."
In the third part of The Strategy for Indirect Action, the writer analyzes Hitler's successes, failures, and collapse. He describes in detail the war in France, Italy, Poland, the Soviet Union. Provides dates, names of military leaders, the movement of armies, the role of allies. Germany contributed to its defeat, the author of the book is sure. “If the allied countries understood the basic principles of the strategy, and not fought in the old way, the damage caused by this war would be less significant,” the author concludes the third part.
Indirect approach
The origin of Liddell’s indirect approach is twofold. From a theoretical point of view, he gives an answer to the actions of political and military leaders who, in his opinion, misinterpreted and misused the theory of the Prussian military thinker of the XIX century - Karl von Clausewitz. Liddell claims that Clausewitz’s poorly understood strategy contributed to the bloodshed in World War I and the slow introduction of alternatives to World War II. The author sets out his point of view in the book "Strategy of indirect actions."
All this cast doubt on the validity of the old theory and required a review of how military force could be used to achieve political goals. In particular, the massive losses and the post-war depletion of the economy of the First World War, as well as the growing importance of aviation, naval power and mechanized ground forces in the Second World War, prompted Liddell that the theory proposed by Clausewitz should be revised.
In fact, aviation is now able to strike at economic and head centers without destroying the enemy on the battlefield. A mechanized war is capable of not only direct attacks, but can also contribute to the collapse of enemy positions without a major battle. Liddell argues that with a good strategy one does not need to overcome resistance, it is necessary to use elements of movement and control to win, taking the enemy off balance before a potential strike.
In other words, deployment is also part of the strategy, and it should be used to maximize gains. Liddell’s strategy means that the commander must take advantage of the new opportunities that a successful deployment and strike will inflict on an adversary before he can recover. Liddell pointed out the nuances of updating the indirect approach, which are known as the 8 principles of the indirect action strategy.
Positive principles
- Choose a goal within your means, guided by sober calculation and common sense. Do not "bite off more than you can swallow." Distinguishing the possible from the impossible is the main sign of military wisdom.
- Do not forget about the goal and adapt your plan to changing circumstances. It is important to remember that the goal can be achieved in various ways, but make sure that each captured object approaches the intended target.
- Choose for your actions the direction from where the enemy least expects a strike. Put yourself in his place and decide which direction the enemy will consider less dangerous, and therefore will not take preventive measures.
- Act on the line of least resistance. And adhere to this direction, while it is possible to get closer to the intended object without unnecessary losses. The author dwells on each point in detail, explains and gives examples from the story in the Strategy for Indirect Action.
- Choose the direction in which a threat will be created to several objects simultaneously. If you outline only one object, then you can probably lose, because the enemy will know the direction of the strike.
- Provide flexibility in the plan and deployment of troops, taking into account possible changes in the situation. Measures should be provided and developed for all occasions: victory or defeat.
Negative principles
- While the enemy is in a better position, do not strike with all your might. As long as the enemy can repulse the blow, it is impossible to deliver an effective blow. Therefore, it is necessary to act only when the enemy is paralyzed.
- Do not resume the offensive in the direction where you failed. Strengthening troops cannot serve as the basis for a new speech, since the enemy will also be able to strengthen his position.
To ensure success of the indirect action strategy, two tasks must be solved: disrupt the enemy’s stability and develop success. The first task must be completed before striking, and the other after. The blow itself is a simple act, but it is impossible to strike an effective strike without creating favorable conditions for this. A blow can be brought to a decisive result only by using the favorable opportunities that will appear before the enemy comes to his senses.
Reviews
According to many readers, the “Indirect Action Strategy” will be interesting not only to the military, but also to everyone who is interested in history. The rich historical material, the analysis of the military operations of generals from Ancient Greece to the Second World War, the availability of presentation allow the modern reader to take a different look at many famous things.
The author conceived this work as an analytical review of battles from ancient times until the middle of the 20th century, and Liddel completely coped with the task. Here a large-scale analysis of these battles is given - readers note the description of theaters of operations, attention to promising types of weapons. The author was able to create an integral picture of the main milestones of military history, to show clearly those patterns that have been manifested in wars for many centuries.
Defending his thesis that the battle is primarily won in the head of the commander, and only then by the soldiers on the battlefield, Liddell touched deep enough on the psychology of war. The author gave enough examples from antiquity and modernity, when the decisions of the commanders had a tremendous influence on the outcome of the battle.